marriage and cases

Title I

MARRIAGE

Chapter I

Requisites of Marriage

            Article I.  Marriage is a special contract of permanent between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life,  it is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except the marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this code. (52a)

Concept of Marriage.

            As a status, it is the civil status of one man and one woman legally united for life, with rights and duties which for the establishment of families and multiplication and education of the species are, or from time to time, may thereafter be assigned by law to matrimony ( bishop, marriage, divorce and separation , sec.  11).

            As an act, it is an act by which a man and a woman united for life, with the intent to discharge towards society and one another those duties which result from the relation of husband and wife ( Scoule, law of dom. Rels., par.11).

Nature of marriage.

            Marriage is not like an ordinary contract, that if there is no performance of one’s duties, an ordinary contract can be the subject of rescission; in marriage there is no such rescission.  In marriage, the remedy of an aggrieved  spouse in case one of the spouses fails to perform his duties, to the extent of bringing dishonor or discredit to the family is to ask for damages.  In ordinary contracts, the remedy is to as for specific performance or rescission with damages in both cases. Or, if one of the spouses leaves the conjugal dwelling, the other spouse may not compel the other to return to the same since the act of living together is a personal act which cannot be compelled by processes of the court.  Even a writ of habeas corpus would not be issued by any court in order to compel coverture.

            Marriage is a permanent union.   The parties cannot fix a period for its efficacy to be ineffective after few years, especially so that its nature, consequences and incidents are not subject to stipulations of the parties –for they governed by law.  Its permanent character has been taken from the well accepted rule that, “What God has out together, no man shall put asunder.”

            The parties, however, may enter into an ante-nuptial agreement as to what property relationship shall govern them during the marriage.  But this agreement shall pertain to their properties alone and not on the incidents and they cannot agree that after a few years, they will consider the marriage void since it is not for them to decide for themselves the validity of their marriage (Rep. v. Albios).  There are obligations imposed upon them by law especially so that the family Code provides that the husband and wife are obliged to live together, “observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.” (Art. 68m Family Code). To emphasize the importance of lmarriage to society the Supreme Court considered as an act of immorality, the act of a judge of cohabiting with another woman despite the existence of a previous valid or existing marriage.  In fact, even if the first spouse has already abandoned him, he cannot just cohabit with another woman, or get married with her without having the first marriage annulled or declared void, for to do so would be making a mockery of the inviolability of the marriage as a basic social institution (MTJ-92-716, October 18, 1995; see also Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995, 60 SCAD 119).

            In Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, no less than the Supreme Court ruled that marriage does not partake of the nature of an ordinary contract.  But it is something more than a mere contract.  It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations.  Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public policy is deeply interested.  In Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, it was said that marriage is an institution in the maintenance of which in its purity, the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there could be neither civilization nor progress.  Bishop, in his comments on Marriage, Divorce and separation, said that the civil status of one man and one woman, legally united for life, with rights and duties which for the establishment of families and the multiplication and education species are, or from time to time may thereafter be assigned by law to matrimony.

            Well-entrenched is the rule that a husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage ---he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death (Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451 [1998].

MAIL-Order-Bride

            To emphasize the importance of marriage as a social institution and a relationship, Congress enacted RA 6955 penalizing any person, natural or judicial, association, club o any entity who may commit any of the following acts:

1.    To establish or carry on a business which has for its purpose  the matching of Filipino women for marriage to foreign nationals either on a mail-order basis or through personal introduction;

2.    To advertise, publish, print or distribute or cause the  brochure, flier, or any propaganda material calculated to promote the prohibited acts in the preceding paragraph;

3.    To solicit, enlist or in any manner attract or induce any Filipino women to become a member in a club or association whose objective is to match women for marriage to foreign nationals whether on a mail-order basis or through personal introduction for a fee;

4.    To use the postal service to promote the prohibited acts in subparagraph 1 (Republic Act No. 6955, Section 2, June 13, 1990).

Presumption of marriage for man and woman deporting themselves to be married.

           

            Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No 57062, January 24, 1992, i

PARRICIDE

FACT:   It appeared that Lupo Mariategui contracted 3 marriages.  With his first wife, he begot four children; second wife, a daughter; third wife, three children. At the time of his death, he left properties which he acquired when still unmarried.  On December 2, 1967, the children in the first and second marriages executed an extrajudicial partition over lot 163.  A title was later on issued under their names.

           

ISSUE: On April 23, 1973, the children in the third marriage filed a complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 and Lots Nos. 669, 1343 and 154 were owned by their father; hence, the adjudication of Lot No. 163in favor of the other heirs deprived them of their share.  They prayed for partition.  The defendants moved for dismissal contending that the complaint was one of recognition of natural children.  It was denied. On February  16, 1977, the complaint and counterclaim were dismissed on the theory that::

            “The plaintiffs’ right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father.  The evidence failed to sustan such premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained.”

            On appeal, the CA declared all the children and descendants of Lupo as entitled to equal shares.  A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied, hence this petition.

Held:  Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married on or about 1930.   This fact has been  based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that “when (his)father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married  before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.” The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.  Although no marriage certificate was introduced to his effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.  Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People v. Borromeo, 133, SCRA 106 [1984]).

            Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between  Lupo and F laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful  wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 3[aa], [bb], [cc], Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Suarnaba v. Workmen’s Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov’t. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]). In fact, in Rivera v. IAC 182 SCRA 322, it was said that Adelaido’s failure to present his parents’ marriage certificate is not fatal to his case as he can still rely on the presumption of marriage.

            Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale

            “The basis of human society throughout the civilized world I that of marriage.  Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.  Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.  Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter –presumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married.  The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law x x x” ( Adong v Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 [1992]; quoted in Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; See also Abadilla v. Tabilira, Jr., 65 SCAD  197, 249  SCRA 447, October 25, 1995, citing Justice Malcolm).

            So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husand and wife and such relationship is not denied or contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov’t. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230).

            The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.  However, considering the affectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new, if not entirely dissimilar, set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989).  Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children ---legitimate and illegitimate.  The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).

            Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

            Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents.  Jacint;o’s birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article.  Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court.  In the case of the two other private respondents, Juliana and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence an of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

            While the trial court found Jacinto’s testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details.  The hanging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until lupo’s  death in 1953  it should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that “ x x x Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama x x x.”

            In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that ;private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285, New Civil Code, for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.

            Speaking of the term “spouses,” the Supreme Court, in Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425, said that it refers to married couples and not to common-law spouses.

Testimonial Evidence to Prove Marriage.

            The case of Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog v. CA, et al.,  G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997, 80 SCAD 229, is a mere reiteration of the rule on presumption of marriage although there was a failure to present the marriage certificate.  But there were testimonies to show that a marriage was celebrated.  It has been held that evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses can be competent to prove gthe marriage.  Indeed, although a marriage contract is primary evidence, the failure to present it is not proof that marriage did not take place.  Other evidence mah be presented to; prove marriage (U.S. v. Memoracion, 34 Phil. 633; People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106).  An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witness who states that the wedding took place, since the very purpose of having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment.  It would be indeed unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence (See also People v. Ignacio, 81 SCAD 138, 270 SCRA 455, where there was a presumption of marriage).

How a marriage may be proven.

            Marriage may be proven by the marriage certificate which is the best evidence.  Any competent and relevant evidence can also prove it.  Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.  The person who officiated the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage (Pugeda v. Trias  4 SCRA 849).  In Balogbog v. CA (269 SCRA 259), it was held that although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place.  Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.  Testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage is allowed. In Trinidad v.  CA (289 SCRA 188), where because of the destruction of the marriage contract, testimonial evidence was accepted in its place (Vda, de Jacob v. CA, G. R. No 13516, August 19, 1999).

Best evidence of marriage is marriage contract; exception. Calcification   Indemnity

            Marriage can be proven by evidence aliunde like the fact that they have deported themselves to be married with children.  In Anonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, G.R. No. 178221, December 10, 2010, 636 SCRA 420, it was said that wh a while marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage .  Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other that the marriage certificate.  Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents (Vda. De Avenido, G.R. No 173540, January 22, 2014).

Institution in a will regarded as evidence of marriage.

           

In Reyes v. CA, et al., G.R. No 124099, October 30, 1997, 88 SCAD 632, the Supreme court further emphasized the presumption of marriage when a man who executed a will instituted his wife.  His illegitimate children contested such portion of the will contending that their father never got married during the lifetime.  They wanted the woman to produce her marriage certificate with their father and when she could not do so, they contended that the woman could not be instituted as one of the heirs of their father.  In brushing aside their contention, the Supreme Court said that there is a presumption of marriage.  It can be proven by evidence aliunde.  This is especially so that the man instituted the wife which was even considered by the Court as a declaration against interest.  In a very eloquent language, the Court said that a will can be considered as the testator talking.  That is, if the will is submitted to probate, it is as if the testator is at the witness stand talking and admitting that he was married to the woman whom he instituted as his wife.  A will is the voice of a person even after his death that is why; the law and jurisprudence give so much respect and credence to a will.

Presumption of marriage; merely rebuttable

            There is a presumption of marriage between persons were deport themselves to be married.  The presumption is merely rebuttable (rule 131,, Rules of Court).

            In Luis Uy v. Sps. Mendoza, G.R. 206220, August 19, 2015, Carpio, j, the SC once again had the occasion to say that there is a presumption established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage (section 3(aa)m rule 131, Rules of Court).  Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – always presume marriage (Delgado vda. De De La Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. De Damian, 516 Phil. 130 [2006]).hthis presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.

            Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.  In Pugeda v. Trias, 114 Phil. 781 [1962], it was held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who  officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

            Documentary evidence may also be shown.  In Villanueva v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84464, June 21, 1991, 198 SCRA 472, it was held that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself.  Under Act no. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114, which is applicable to the present case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was solemnized.  The third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage.

            Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place.  Even the finding of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca.  On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other.

In proving marriage, proof of fact can be accepted aside from the marriage certificate.

            Secondary evidence can be shown to prove the loss of the marriage certificate.

           

The due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, may be shown.  They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss a “secondary” evidence of the marriage.  In Hernaez v Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:

A court would be entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument is barred.  The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document.  It is the content, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible.  Proofs of the execution of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.  It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers.  Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (Vda. De Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014).

Rationale behind gthe presumption of marriage.

            The rationale behind the presumption of marriage is the basic principle that the basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.  Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is anew relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.  Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.  Person dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.  The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.  A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.  (Vda. De Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No.  173540, January 22, 2014 citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 [1992]).

Effect if marriage certificate was not registered.

            The non-registration of the marriage certificate or marriage contract does not negate the existence of marriage.   Registration in not an element of validity of marriage, especially so that its existence can be proven by evidence aliunde.

Characteristic of marriage

            To emphasize how society treats and considers the importance of marriage, the Supreme Court said that marriage is not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment.  Hence, it was said in Santos v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995,58 SCAD 17, that:

            “We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that-----

            “Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.  It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

            “Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

            ‘Section 12.  The State recognizes the sanctity of the family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.  It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.  The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.’

            Section 1.  The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation.  Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.’

            ‘Section 2.   Marriage , as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.’ (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

            “The above  provisions express sos well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are no doubt the tenets we still hold on to.’ (Santos v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995, 58 SCAD 17).

            Such protection is manifest from the strict interpretation of the Philippine marriage laws, such that in case of legal separation, annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage, the State is represented by the prosecutors to prevent the presentation of fabricated evidence or collusion between the parties.

            Along the same vein, the Supreme Court, in Republic v. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20 (March 17, 1993), said that the spouses should not be allowed, by the mere simple expedient that one of them left the conjugal home and never to return again to circumvent that laws on marriage which is not an ordinary but a special contract of permanent union.  The Supreme Court in this case considered as not serious efforts to look for a missing wife the acts of simply asking friends or neighbors the whereabouts of his wife and sending a letter to her former place of work and when there was no answer he asked the court to declare her as presumptively dead.  They were considered as merely sketchy acts of looking for the missing spouse.  It was said that such acts do not warrant the declaration of presumptive death, for the law seeks to preserve the marriage instead of wrecking it.